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S O U L S A N D S E N A T O R S
An Editorial

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SOULS AND SENATORS

Does man's best friend, the dog, possess a soul? To judge from the recent newspaper headlines and features, this seems to be the psychological question of the hour. The French Academy has voted (8 to 5) that they have; the 'Immortals' of the United States' Senate tied with a vote of four to four, five not voting. The newspapers express the divided opinions of many eminent scholars — educators, scientists and professional men. And now the question is put to us. Do dogs possess a soul?

This seems at first sight, to be a straight and direct question that can be answered yes or no. But it is far from being such. In fact, the question stands, I can truthfully say yes and just as truthfully say no, according to the meaning I should attribute to the word, soul. This it is probably that is causing most of the discussion. To the general question we must offer the answer given by Chas. E. Cory, professor of philosophy at Washington University, in the St. Louis Star for Jan. 5. "It depends on what you mean by soul. They would not have a rational one."

But have dogs any kind of a soul? The statement of Rev. Raphael C. McCarthy, professor of experimental psychology at St. Louis University, also in the Star, I think, is the true answer to this question. All living beings, and hence ~~all~~ animals, possess some vital principle, some ultimate source of vital activity, something over and above the chemical substances and the chemical forces that make up the body, something that makes the body living. This something may be called a soul, not in the sense that it is rational or spiritual or immortal, but only in the sense that it is a principle of life, a being higher than the chemical constituents of the body which it makes living. We know of the existence of this soul, not because anyone has ever seen or touched it, but because reason tells us that every effect must have a proportionate and adequate cause. Now chemical substances and chemical forces are not sufficient to constitute a living being or to explain life. A chemist may take the precise chemical substances, ~~and~~ he may take the exact proportions and he may place them in the same physical conditions and yet he can never produce a dog that can see and feel and grow and generate its own kind — in a word, a living dog.

And now to the other part of the question: have dogs souls like ours? We are sure they have not. But to judge from the answers of some of ~~the~~ our senators (which are not clear and explicit), they would seem to think that they

they have. Senator Wheeler of Montana is quoted as saying "If some people have souls, so do dogs, and other animals," and Senator Borah of Idaho, "I'm satisfied that my horse has a soul and the more I associate with dogs the more I believe they possess souls." Let us suppose that the senators are right and that dogs and other animals (for there is no reason for stopping with dogs) have souls like ours, rational souls. Then there is no difference between a horse and a man and a dog. Dogs and horses become responsible for their actions. They must be arrested and fined and sent to jail. They must be sent to school and taught Latin and algebra. They must be admitted to the professions— medicine, law, and — the Senate. Supposing Mr. Borah derives pleasure from his association with dogs, I wonder whether he would enjoy them as colleagues in the august assembly of the senate. And yet they must be represented. Ours is a democratic government where there are to be no privileged classes, where all may vote and all hold public office. Senators Wheeler and Borah, were they logically to follow up their vote, would start working for a ~~new~~ new emancipation proclamation. However, we hope they may proceed slowly, as we foresee great disaster if millions of uneducated "human" animals, all these years kept in slavery, were suddenly to be given their freedom. We shudder at the fate of our august Senate when Mr. Cat, who may become Vice President of the United States, tries to restore order after Mr. Bull Dog, Mr. Mountain Lion and Mr. Borah have entered into an argument.

No, we are sure dogs have not a soul like ours— a spiritual, rational soul. We study a soul from its effects and animals cannot think, judge or reason. How do we know that animals have no intelligence? I shall summarize my argument; I must be brief. We know that animals cannot think because they have never given one unmistakable sign that they have intelligence. I shall explain.

We know from experience that it is the very nature of intelligence to communicate ideas. Sometime when you are in the company of a crowd of your friends, try to go a whole day without saying a word, and without communicating your ideas in any other way. So strong is this tendency that intellectual beings will overcome every difficulty and obstacle to communicate with another rational creature. Thus we have the famous case of Helen Keller. She was born deaf, dumb, and blind, and still she succeeded in learning English, French and German and became an educated woman in science and philosophy, and she learned to carry on a conversation by putting her hands to your throat and lips and understanding from the ~~the~~ actions of these organs these three languages.

Now this is just the argument. Animals are social beings, they live together and have parents and brothers and sisters and some, like dogs and horses, have been companions to men— yet they never ~~learn~~ learn to speak; they never convey or express ideas. Since it is the nature of intelligence to communicate ideas, we must conclude therefore that they are lacking in ideas and intelligence.

True, they express emotions and feelings by natural signs, i.e. signs that by their very nature express the emotion and the feeling, such as groaning, which betrays pain. But they cannot use ARBITRARY signs; i.e. signs that take their meaning from the agreement made between two or more rational creatures. Thus the English language is a system of arbitrary symbols agreed upon by the inhabitants of these United States. The sign language is a system of arbitrary signs among the deaf and dumb, and so on, Natural signs indicate feelings and instincts and phantasms but not thought. These animals use. ARBITRARY signs are essential to the expression of thought and ideas; these animals never use. They perform actions which ^{some} might consider signs of intelligence but these signs are never infallible signs of intelligence. They can all be explained by instinct, sensation or phantasms. They may be taught to do wonderful actions but they clearly show that they do not understand what they are doing. You cannot teach your dog

THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS AT NOTRE DAME

The first paper outlined the growth of New Realism as an American philosophy, and a contender with Pragmatism for popular favor. Its revolt against Idealism is complete: Idealism left us only the knowing subject, New Realism leaves only the known object. Knowledge is merely a particular cross-section of the universe, and as such is totally in the object. False and true are both real. The true is; the false is not. Thus New Realism elucidates the problem of knowledge.

Father McCarmick's paper was a clear presentation of the genesis of Psycho-Physical Parallelism. This theory is the latest despairing attempt to explain the interaction of "matter and mind". By contending that the two are but alternate phases of the same reality, it ends in monism.

The second day saw the current non-Scholastic views of religion succinctly outlined by Dr. Sheen. Notable among the se views is the notion of God as identified with nature, but not with Deity. This separation of "God" and "Deity" is to make room for evolution. For "God", or Nature, evolves toward "Deity", the latter being the next stage beyond the present. Duty then is "helping God to attain Deity". Religion is altogether personal, a matter of selecting whatever concepts may be valuable to me for contentment of mind.

Dr. Ryan discarded his paper and spoke ex-tempore on the standards of morality, and how we should present our standards in a convincing manner. Dr. Pace's address at the dinner in Carroll Hall was a masterful sketch of the course of recent philosophical thought, and showed that in the last analysis that course is determined by a choice between mechanism and finality. The most recent turn is toward finality, but with a perversion of its meaning.

The discussion of the papers at the regular meetings showed that the house was divided into the two groups usually recognizable at a congress of Catholic philosophers. Some wish to hear what our "adversaries" have to say, others wish to hear our own position, and how it may be fortified. At this particular convention there did not seem to be a difference of purpose; both sides of the house wished to "convert" the adversaries. But there was a difference of method. One group was for carrying Scholastic philosophy into the arena and making it win by its own force and consistency, - without bothering about the preconceived notions of the non-Scholastics. The other group thought that we cannot have success until we study those preconceived notions, and then accept what is good in them, and reject the rest. Dr. Corcoran appeared to lead the former group, and Dr. J.H. Ryan the latter. The vocal portion of the house sided mostly with the former group, and sometimes indulged in round denunciations of the non-Scholastic systems. The silent majority seemed content to hear "the other side", i.e., the non-Scholastic systems, so long as the impression is not given that Scholastic philosophy is merely one of many. At bottom there was the general conviction of all present that there is only one true philosophy, whatever it may be called.

Marquette University and Holy Cross College extended invitations to the members to meet in 1927 at these schools; the final decision, however, is to be determined by a vote of the members of the Association.

James A. McWilliams, S.J.

THE CHAMBERLAIN-MOULTON THEORY ON THE ORIGIN OF THE EARTH

(NOTE: This article is the first part of a paper read by Mr. Cavanaugh before the students of Cosmology at St. Louis University. We are publishing it at the suggestion of several who think it may be of interest to our readers. The second part will appear next month. THE EDITOR.)

In the early stages of his scientific endeavors, Thomas Chrowder Chamberlain, the eminent geologist of the University of Chicago, together with Dr. F. R. Moulton of the Mount Wilson Observatory, was lead to a scientific investigation of the LaPlace Hypothesis on the formation of the earth. In the light of the more recent theory of gases - the Kinetic Theory, namely - they found, and their findings were confirmed by other scientific tests, that the LaPlace theory was so untenable and so full of unexplainable contradictions that it could no longer be held with any scientific certainty. But true scientist that Chamberlain was, he not only destroyed the pre-existing theory, but on the ruins of the shattered hypothesis he built up another formula which seemed to coincide more closely with the data on hand.

All through his book, which he has called "The Origin of the Earth", he delights to speak of what he calls the vestiges of cosmic states. There was a time when pre-human history was purely a matter of speculation, when, as the sceptic would say, no man was alive to witness the processes that were taking place; hence, that period is outside the pale of scientific certainty. But that time has vanished and man has learned to interpret the vestiges of past events, to read the records in stone, which lead to a certitude that is the equal, at least, of human testimony, for it is the record left by the processes that were the working out of the forces planted in matter by the All-wise Creator, and consequently it is the testimony of the Creator Himself.

"The most tangible part of the record," says Chamberlain, "is found in the material vestiges, in footprints of processes and footprints of living creatures in ripple marks, in fossils -- and in a multitude of distinctive marks left by former activities. But these materialistic records are by no means the only ones, nor always the most important. There are DYNAMIC relics that are as truly the vestiges of processes once in progress as are the fossils and strata. These dynamic vestiges may be rotations, revolutions, inclinations of axes, ellipticities, or any other of the activities, attitudes, or configurations that make up the subject-matter of celestial mechanics and of terrestrial dynamics. These residual activities, attitudes, and configurations may imply past events as specific in their natures and as illuminating in their historic significance as those more material vestiges of earth processes by which its history is now so confidently read." (page 38)

It was, therefore, by putting the planetary system through this dynamical test, by reading the legend that these dynamical vestiges of former processes tell us, that Chamberlain and Moulton were lead to the investigation of the discrepancies in the Nebular Hypothesis and to the establishment of an hypothesis of their own. These two scientists found that there were ten specific defects in the LaPlace Hypothesis that could not possibly be accounted for in any dynamical test to which they put it. An explanation of these would lead us too far afield in this short paper, hence we will omit them here.

For a better understanding of the Chamberlain Hypothesis, however, I will indicate three critical features that any cosmogonic theory must take into account.

1. It is to be noted, and that with emphasis, that our planetary system is an oppressed disk of revolving bodies centered on an invariable plane. And that the total mass of the planets compared with that of the sun is 1 to 745.
2. The composite plane ~~of the system~~ of all the planets, that is a summation of the inclinations of all the planets to the equator of the sun as well as the plane of ~~each of~~ the planets is inclined to the equator of the sun. (Compare with Nebular Hypothesis).
3. Though the mass of the sun is 744/745 of the mass of the whole system, it has but two percent of the revolutionary momentum (moment of inertia times the angular velocity) of the whole. This is a severe test or criterion indeed, and will always be a lion in the path for all possible theories of cosmogonic origin.

To quote from Chamberlain himself. (p 71). "All of the criteria involved in the singular features must be met with by any hypothesis that is entitled to be regarded as having any working qualities; they must, of course, fully be met by the true theory as well as other critical features that have not been cited."

Now then, with these critical features in mind, and remembering that this hypothesis is to be developed from purely dynamical principles, let follow up some of the investigations and reasoning processes by which Chamberlain and Moulton arrives at their conclusions.

In the first place, it cannot be reasonably doubted without running into innumerable difficulties that the sun and the planets had a common origin; in other words, that the planets, satellites and planetoids are offsprings of the sun. But how did this separation take place and what was its immediate cause? The Nebular Hypothesis no longer bears up under scientific scrutiny. The dynamical features cited above: 1. in the central body, (the sun)- great mass, low momentum, oblique attitude; 2. in the attendants (the planets)- small mass, high momentum, oppressed disk, are unmistakable signs of an outside influence other than the internal forces of the system as a whole. The conclusion is a bi-parental origin for the planetary system. Did it happen, then, that another heavenly body collided with our sun and in the scattering of the fragments result in the present configuration of the system? Though this is one form of bi-parental origin, Chamberlain answers, no. By no collisional process could we explain the extremely divergent characteristics of the sun and the planets. Hence, we must resort to a milder form of bi-parental origin. And this Chamberlain does in his formidable chapter, entitled DYNAMIC ENCOUNTER BY CLOSE APPROACH.

In very large bodies cohesion is of little moment relatively when compare with gravitation. Why? Take a gaseous body, there is no cohesion at all, in fact, the molecules repel one another, and it is only gravity that holds them in a mass. Take a solid body, again very large; the interior suffers an enormous compression. For example, the earth; at times the internal elastic resistance exceeds the gravitational compression and we have a violent volcanic eruptions and earthquakes.

Now take the sun. First of all, due to high interior heat energy and dynamic activity, powerful eruptions are continuously going on and great bolts of sun-substance are being shot up into solar space at enormous velocities and to tremendous heights. These are the well-known solar prominences that are the lure of all astronomic enthusiasts at the time of solar eclipses. By actual measurement these tongues of sun-substance are projected outward from the surface of the sun to an

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CHRISTMAS READING

This may be a peculiar title for an article in a philosophical journal. We usually associate "Christmas Reading" with stories and playlets, and poetry and verses that treat of Christ, and kings, and camels and beautiful music and a brilliant star,— stories in which animals talk with trees and the winds, and angels sing glory to God. But— a philosopher does not often walk into a cozy room, with soft chairs around a center table containing a large number of current magazines; a philosopher seldom finds such leisure and such inducement to sit down and read — to read even philosophical articles. He should then be excused if in drawing attention to certain philosophical works which he found valuable, he calls them "Christmas Reading" even if the articles be so styled "per extrinsecam denominationem".

In Harper's Magazine for December 1926, Will Durant has an article on philosophy, "The Failure of Philosophy". In this article Durant tries to discover the reason for the passing of philosophy. He pictures the past glories of philosophy when "thrones and papacies feared philosophy and imprisoned her votaries," and contrasts these glories with her present sad plight. "Philosophy is not loved today," he says, "because the sciences are snatching from her one by one her ~~an~~ ancient spacious realms." He claims that philosophers since Descartes, have been more epistemologists. Then after pointing out many things which philosophy has become but should not be, he proceeds to tell what philosophy is and ought to be.

Personally, I found it an excellent eulogy of philosophy, if critically read. Harper's "Personal and Otherwise" states that Durant "thought of becoming a Catholic priest and turned socialist instead." Accordingly the reader must be on his guard against his ethical theories and doctrines of evolving deity. He is rather hard on Scholasticism: not that Scholasticism does not deserve some of his blame, but he refuses to give it any credit, while in substance it is Scholasticism that he teaches. In the last sections he is at his best. "Philosophy," he says, "will not fatten our purses, nor lift us to dizzy dignities in a democratic state...it will give us a healing unity of soul. Philosophy is harmonized knowledge making a harmonious life. Knowledge is power but only wisdom is liberty. ...we are rich in mechanisms and poor in purposes...we have 200,000 politicians but not a single statesman; we move about the earth with unprecedented speed but do not know where we are going or whether we shall find happiness there for our restless souls. We are being destroyed by our knowledge, which has made us drunk with ~~power~~ our power. And we shall not be saved without wisdom."

JJO.

"The Duty to doubt" in the December issue of The Century Magazine, by J.B.S. Haldane of Cambridge University, England. Not only will Mr. Haldane "take nobody's word for it", but he balks at trusting his own. This article is a cleverly thought out attack against the moral law. Under the spell of a charming style the author ventures to blend good advice on scientific problems with diabolical recommendations in morals. Since we realize now that "planets do not go around the sun in circles as Copernicus thought;" and "gravitation is a more complex affair than Galileo or even Newton believed;" "Einstein would certainly not regard any of his laws as final accounts of the behaviour of matter," and in general, we moderns are quite ready to accept "the duty to doubt" in scientific matters. Mr. H. forgets that man has no chance to doubt against a moral law graven in his heart, and advocates the duty to doubt in regard to the ideal number of ~~of~~ children, experimentation in contraception and honeymoons. Mr. H. has failed to distinguish the fields of science and morals. The motto of the Royal Academy may be paraphrased "We take nobody's word for it". But Mr. Haldane is unwilling that a man take the word of his own conscience.

C.M.O'H.

THE, ETERNAL QUESTION

What is it that the human heart seeks for most? Undoubtedly a great number of people would make little hesitation in replying, "Happiness"; and in its last analysis, happiness or its equivalent, would be the universal reply. To undertake an enumeration of all the meanings that word can have would be to attempt an impossible count of the whims of mankind; but since, happiness, in some form or other is the quest of every mortal, there must be some common note within it which determines its choice by all. We shall find such a note when we consider that no desire ever springs up in the heart of man that is not for an object of good, or at least for something under the appearance of good. That common note, then, in the desire for happiness, is unquestionably "the good", but the point of vital importance is to discern the true from the imaginary good; and the fact that there is such a diversity and constant change in the notions of good shows that for many its determination is an eternal question. Well has Juvenal said;

"Omnibus in terris quae sunt a Gadibus usque
Auroram et Gangem, fauci dignoscere possunt
Vera bona atque ipsos multum diversa".

The fault, if there is any, perhaps lies with reason. To such a statement Bernard Shaw would subscribe, for he tells us, "What I think is true today, I may tomorrow declare to be false." What a convenience this chameleon attitude must be when bills and promise-to-pay notes come due! But abstracting from the fact that your banker may have a like would-be philosophical change of mind in your favor, there is another and unpleasant side to the matter. Such an attitude means a state wherein the intellect remains at a standstill. Seeking for something it still denies its ability to recognize with any degree of permanence - that something when once it attains it; and by such a mode of action it becomes guilty of self-contradiction, ridiculousness and even intellectual suicide.

Our intellect craves truth - truth to know what is for its good and consequently for its happiness; truth in deciding its own course of conduct; truth in detecting the sincerity of others; truth about the things it seeks to know. There is no requirement for a philosopher, but rather a child to tell you, once the truth about a thing is given us we are satisfied; but, again, for how long? This the age of knowledge, of widespread discovery in every field of human activity; yet there never was an age of such mental restlessness. Surely if truth brings rest to the intellect there must be a distinction in truth itself - a kind of truth - which brings such rest; and finally, a truth which will enable men to settle what is his true good, - his happiness.

There is such a truth, a truth which men like Shaw deny the intellect can have, a truth so wonderful that it prepares man for the greatest happiness, and a truth which because of the dignity to which it raises man gives him a great responsibility. That truth is no other than certitude - secure and well-founded self-conviction that one possesses the truth; this will come if the reason is followed and trusted in the proper way, this will bring satisfaction to the mind, and this will lead man to a recognition and final attainment of his greatest happiness: God.

"The happiest moments of the mind," says a famous writer, "are those in which it finds itself in the possession of a great truth." Finds itself -- knows that it has truth, that it possesses not merely truth, but certitude. It is not hard to see why Shaw will not admit this power of the mind, for he knows, that this granted, the intellect will come to the attainment of such truths as God's existence, the distinction between right and wrong, and so of all great fundamental truths. It is ~~hard~~ not hard to see how Shaw and his adherents having travelled their self-darkened course of reason for so long, can be in conflict with the ethical standards of the Catholic Church and ~~the~~ ^{the} larger part of the civilized world for twenty centuries; and it is not hard to see how Shaw has found so little happiness possible for the human heart as to offer justification to the practice of euthanasia.

"What is truth?" asked Pilate of the Son of God. Today the man who turned away from Christ is having many faithful imitators, not least of whom is Shaw. Herein lies the touchstone of the world's difficulties; it cannot recognize truth because it says it cannot; it almost reiterates Pilate's question when it asks in questionnaire form in one of our large newspapers: "Is there a God?"

Certitude takes away this atmosphere of anxiety, self-imposed. It is a really wonderful power to possess, this ability to be sure; but it ~~has~~ is by this power alone that man can find peace ~~for~~ for his soul. Then he will see and recognize his true happiness, God; then he will order his conduct to be truly happy even in this world; for then his will will be at peace, through the only way it can be at peace: when as Shakespeare says, "it is by his reason swayed".

"Das Wahre war schar längst gefunden
Hat edle Geisterschaft verbunden,
Das alte Wahre, foss es an."

--- Goethe.

"Truth was discovered long ago
It has been the possession of the best minds,
Hold on to it."

Walter O. Crane, S.J.

THE CHAMBERLAIN-MOULTON THEORY ON THE ORIGIN OF THE EARTH (Continued from page fifty one)

average distance of 200,000 miles, or approximately the distance from the earth to the moon; a distance of half the radius of the sun. It is only ^{by} the gravitational influence of the enormous mass of the sun that the sun holds together at all and does not fly off into infinitesimal particles throughout the realms of space. Secondly, suppose this gravitational influence were neutralized by the counter attraction of an outside body. The forces working to hold the sun together would then be released and the counter forces tending to blow the body apart would have nothing to withstand them. Consequently, the eruptions would become greater in intensity and in mass. Three factors would enter into this dynamic disturbance:

1. The closeness of approach of the two bodies,
2. The relative mass of the two,
3. The internal state of them.

Paul W. Cavanaugh, S.J.

SPIRITUAL EXERCISES IN A SYLLOGISM

The Spiritual Exercises have often been commended for their strict logic. This feature of them has been stressed so frequently that one is inclined to accept the fact as true without being precisely sure of its objective evidence. There is indefinitely more satisfaction in running the mind's eye over the network of logic that gives form to the substance of the Spiritual Exercises, than there is in merely looking at the finished whole and being told that such a network is the sub-structure upon which is woven the finished, unified system of practical reasoning. It occurred to us that if this order of thought were so marked then, by a general survey of the Exercises, we might uncover one thread of reasoning that was carried unbroken through the entire plan. There may be more than one such thread, perhaps there is, but surely that one must weave its way through the principal exercises, knitting into one organized scheme the high points of the four weeks. Our plan was to draw from the Exercises a syllogism into which might be logically telescoped most of the important matter of the Ignatian Retreat. Thus we might supply an empirical argument for the rigid logic of the Spiritual Exercises.

The most evident part of the endeavor was that the Imitation of Christ was the pivot of the whole plan. It was the ideal radiating its influence into nearly all the meditations, the First Week excepted. To link this concept with the Foundation was the crux; for the Foundation is eminently the most important part in the plan of the Exercises. This done the syllogism reads:

As a creature of God I am bound to perfect service of God.

But, - perfect service of God (indeed, the most perfect) is the imitation of the God Incarnate in poverty and humiliations.

Therefore, - I am bound to the imitation of Christ, the God Incarnate, in poverty and humiliations.

Every meditation of the Exercises is explanatory of, or contained in, this syllogism. The major is the work of the Foundation. The minor is the burden of the meditations on the Mysteries of the Life of Christ, and the *raison d'être* of the distinctive exercises of the Second Week. The conclusion is accepted in the Election; and its acceptance is sealed with the "Suscipe" of the final exercise. In this undertaking we have stripped a masterpiece of all its beauty, leaving only the naked skeleton. While not denying to the Exercises their use of psychology, their fine play on the emotions, and their evident manifestations of a thorough knowledge of human nature, we have not made specific reference to them in this outline. Nor were we rash enough to try to lay bare the delicate refinements and the sublime heights of sanctity contained therein, before which we stand mute and reverent.

The MAJOR: Qualifications are needed in the words "creature", and "bound". "Creature" here must be restricted to intelligent beings, and these not angels. St. Ignatius is laying down rules for men. How the angels, created before the promise even of the Incarnation, attained their proper degree of perfection is not our question. Then, "bound" is not to be interpreted in the strict moral sense; but rather as an obligation of propriety.

The Foundation contains the major; the cold reason of its verity is patent. It gives in skeleton the purpose of creation, and advances toward our major in a progressive polysyllogism:

I am a creature of God. (Man was created.) Therefore I belong entirely to God. But since I belong to God I must fulfil His purpose and thus please Him. Therefore I have an obligation of doing whatsoever He commands. But this binds me to give Him a perfect service.

Therefore am I bound to His perfect service.

The meditations on sin and hell, here introduced, supply the energizing psychological power that makes the conclusion of the intellect be firmly established as a resolution of the will.

The MINOR: Early in the Second Week is presented the keystone exercise of the whole plan, the Kingdom of Christ. Here is presented a king who embodies a perfect service of God, whom I must strive to imitate am I to serve God. This king is revealed as a similitude for Christ, the God Incarnate. And before I rise off my knees from this exercise I have pledged myself to an imitation of Christ.

This is a rather swift and sweeping onrush to a high aim. But the logic of Ignatius is not a flash that passes with a streak of fire and lives only as a memory. No, it is sure, is enduring, and is made firm by many arguments. So the general proposition, "I must imitate Christ, since the perfect service of God consists in the imitation of Him," is narrowed down in that masterly meditation, the Two Standards, to this, "I must imitate Christ in His poverty and in His humiliations." Now even this must be submitted to the persistent refinement of the Ignatian system, as humility is explained in the Incarnation and poverty is pictured in the Nativity. Behold the minor! Gradually, very gradually so as not to shock or overwhelm the weak nature of the beginner, our holy Founder unfolds in its persuasive details the poverty and humiliations of Christ as instanced in His life on earth. Each new exercise is a finer analysis of the meaning of the minor, a new detail of my signal service, a new urge to my ready acceptance.

Just previous to the Election, there is still one step that has to be made firm; is the imitation of Christ the most perfect service when there is an option of two choices; the one easy, the other hard? Any doubt here is quickly cancelled by the consideration of the Three Degrees of Humility, wherein the love of Christ prompts me to choose with (therefore imitation) Christ poverty, suffering, and humiliations rather than riches, comforts, and honors. The intellect is now completely at rest regarding the possible degrees and perfection of imitation. There remains the will.

The Stage is now set for the grand choice of unselfish imitation of Christ. The Election is presented. Backed by the persuasive exercises of the Second Week, its outcome is inevitable; the highest point of the Spiritual Exercises has been scaled. The free will, persuaded of the truth and the merit of its decision, chooses freely a degree of imitation, of perfect service, and clinches for itself the conclusion of our syllogism. The distance of this point from the Kingdom of Christ, taking thoughtful account of the intermediary meditations, is a question of psychology rather than of logic. Logic will not explain all; it will not, for instance, give the proof of that all but mad love which here begins to possess the exercitant for the Person of Christ.

The Passion is an exposition of the details of the Third Degree as accepted and understood by Christ. It is the omega of perfect service. These details are reserved for the stout-hearted who have passed the Election courageously. They are not a progression beyond the Election, but only explanatory of the ultimate reaches of Christ's perfect service, and, in a way, confirmatory of the Election. The meditations on the Glorious Life, completing the four weeks, are confirmatory also of the Election. They demonstrate the approval which God has set upon the life of Christ. In a word, this Fourth Week is God's own confirmation of the certitude of our syllogism and its application.

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A NEO-SCHOLASTIC CLASSIC

In the year 1922 appeared the first section (cahiers I, II, III.) of what is possibly the most profound, certainly in many ways the most original product of Neo-Scholastic scholarship, Father Marechal's "The Point of Departure of Metaphysics". *

It is an historical and theoretical inquiry into the problem of knowledge from two points of view, 1) the epistemological dogmatism (in the technical sense of that word) of St. Thomas, and 2) the radical criticism of modern philosophers, especially Kant.

The New Scholasticism, now that it has thoroughly established its connection with modern science, presses on to its second great objective the rap-
prochement with modern philosophy. This it hopes to achieve, not by an truck-
ling to non-Scholastic thought, not by yielding in any of its essential principles but by a serious, and sympathetic study of the whole of philosophy from both points
of view. With what result? First, that it can demand, and will receive a hearing
from other modern philosophers; and second, what it says will be of real worth to the cause of philosophy, something constructive, and not mere negative "refutation". Father Marechal's book is one of the pioneers in this new endeavor.

The Modern Schoolman has been fortunate enough to secure an informal review of the last section published (cahier V). It is written by one who studied under Father Marechal at the Collegium Maximum, S.J., Louvain,—Mr. Hehier, S.J., who is at present studying theology at Milltown Park, Dublin.

We gratefully reproduce Mr. Hehier's letter below.

H. Morrison.

"Pere Marechal's fifth book (the fourth did not appear) is now on the market. *Le Thomisme devant la Critique Moderne*. Censors have caused him to overload it with citations from St. Thomas. He had to prove that his doctrine is really a true exposition of the thought of the Angelic Doctor, provided the works of the latter are read as books and not consulted for quotations as a railway guide or a dictionary. He has made the volume difficult to read; but he has left it a real master-piece.

"There are two parts: the first is an exposition of St. Thomas's Epistemology from the Aquinate's own view-point, i.e., supposing the critical problem already solved, absolute objectivity granted, metaphysics founded, etc.: an ontological explanation and vigorous justification of human knowledge based mainly on the tendency of our intellect, by participation of the Veritas Prima to the ever increasing, but always finite, fruition of the same Veritas. The second takes up the same problem from a purely modern point of view: purely critical as Kant would take it up, or Hegel.

"Begins from the elementary judgment, as a fact which none can deny. For in denying it (v.g., There is no judgment, or I do not admit it, etc.) you implicitly affirm. (v.g., It is absolutely true that there is no judgment. It is absolutely true that I think it is not true. Says St. Thomas, 'Qui negat

* Le point de depart de la Metaphysique.--Lecons sur le developpement historique et theoretique du probleme de la connaissance, par le R.P.J.Marechal, S. Bruges: Charles Beyaert - Paris: Felix Alcan.

veritatem esse, affirmat veritatem esse. Affirmat, enim, verum esse veritatem non esse.)

"Then by critical analysis along Kant's lines, Marechal analyses this judgment to find its 'necessary' conditions (that is, the conditions implied rigorously in it, such that who makes a judgment implicitly affirms the value of those conditions. For should he deny them, in his very denial he affirms them, if they are rigorously necessary and absolutely essential to sensibility (he shows the corresponding element in St. Thomas -- quidquid recipitur ad modum recipientis recipitur) which the Saint applies always to sense activity. He finds things similar to the "categories". Above all he finds rigorously (and proves it absolutely) the absolute affirmation of 'being'.

"Thus he shows that Kant need never have adopted his agnosticism. The latter was due to his leaving out one 'condition' of the judgement. Had he ~~re-~~ seen this condition to be necessary (he did not do so because he failed to remember that knowledge is an activity) the Koenigsberger would (or should) never have written the last part of his 'Kritik'.

"Marechal then goes on to show that this condition, which was first pointed out vaguely by Hegel does not lead on to pantheism. That our affirmation of all 'being' does not imply rigorously that we have all being in us. There is a middle way in which truth lies, between Kant's extreme and Hegel's. We affirm all being in every judgment, and indeed absolute being, but we participate in the esse of God, not in a pantheistic sense but in the Catholic sense 'per efficientiam et concreationem'. So that though our intellects are participations of the Infinite Intellect, and our will (velle) of the Infinite Will, yet our intellect, will, being are finite by the fact of our participation. (This also is proved by analysis.) The Pere can thus join up with his first point. Participation of the Prima Veritas gives us our absolute truth. And he can found thus the elementary and fundamental thesis of Criteriology (Absolute Truth), of Theodicy (the Principle of Contradiction bound up with the principle of causality and the Existence of God) and Moral (the existence and goodness of the absolute good, foundation of our 'absolute' obligation.

"These are only scraps, probably inaccurate ideas of the book, from recollections of twelve months ago. I read it in manuscript and did not get to read more than one third this year. They would hardly serve as a review for the Modern Schoolman, unless with this added caution; but they may lead you to persuade someone to get the book and review it, or to look out the continental reviews of it. These latter will begin to appear, "Revue de Philosophie, Mind, Logos, (German), Etudes, Studies, probably in the next three or four months. The book takes time to read, as the Irish reviewer is showing, by taking some six months to it."

Hehier, S.J.

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SEMINAR NOTES

EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY SEMINAR

A change was necessitated in the schedule of the Experimental Psychology Seminar due to the postponement of the triduum from December to January. The paper on "Hypnotism" by Mr. Krizek, which was to have been read on January 3 has been postponed two weeks. The subject scheduled for January 17th has been dropped. Other meetings will take place as originally planned. They are:

- Jan. 31 Influence of Fear on Conduct. (Mr. Cahill)
- Feb. 14 Heredity. (Mr. Monaghan)
- Feb. 23 Dreams. (Mr. Meyer)
- Mar. 14 The Sub-Conscious and the Unconscious. (Mr. Welfle)
- Mar. 28 The Emotions: How Much Fundamentum in the Soul? (Mr. O'Brien)
- Apr. 11 The Reflex Action. (Mr. Cantwell).

The following discussions were held before the Christmas holidays:

- Nov. 15 Scrupulosity: A Psychic State of Obsession. (Mr. FitzGibbon)
- Nov. 29 Effects of Sympathy. (Mr. Keeven)
- Dec. 13 Psychological Element in Rules for Discernment of Spirits.
(Mr. McCormack).

The plan of procedure of the Seminar met with success. Father Raphael C. McCarthy's assistance in the capacity of final court of appeal in the discussion and as adviser in the preparation of the papers which precede each discussion, is a factor that enables the group to work efficiently without loss of time. Much importance is attached to the preparation of the papers themselves. They are supposed to be the results of intensive reading on the subject in hand, and attempt to sum up in a twenty-minute or half-hour treatise work that has been carried on for months. We promise a fuller account of the papers and discussions and also of the work of the Seminar in the near future.

FIRST YEAR

The first 1927 meeting of one of the first year study clubs was led in discussion by Mr. Ireland, who spoke on "Methods of Dealing with Scepticism". Mr. Sheridan, late of Mount St. Michael's Philosophate of Spokane, attended the meeting as a new member. The next subject down for discussion will be presented by Mr. Koch, - "An Introduction to the Sources of Knowledge". This meeting will carry us past the middle of January.

SECOND YEAR

Second year has finished Cosmology. The oral examinations were held before the Christmas holidays. And now the members of this year have started ~~to study~~ the study of Psychology. Father Gruender is the professor of Rational, and Father McCarthy is the professor of Experimental Psychology. This is the third year now that Cosmology and Psychology have not been taken together as was formerly the custom.

ORESTES BROWNSON b. 1803 (same year as Emerson, another American philosopher) He lived to be a picturesque, venerable man of 73. Died at Detroit. Seems never to have been a child. Always studying and battling, he was successively a politician (Democrat and then co-founder of a short-lived labor party), a minister of the Presbyterians, of the Universalists, of the Independents, of the Unitarians. Edited various religious papers, evangelized Boston for 12 years, and in 1844 escaped infidelity and socialism by becoming a Catholic. From 1844 to 1864 he edited the religio-social, politico-philosophical *Brownson's Review*. Again edited it from '73 to '75. His collected works are in 20 large volumes: style vigorous and vivid. Ency. Brit. styles B. "an independent follower" of Comte (positivist and relativist and later of Victor Cousin (the French eclectic philosopher). Regarded as an Ontologist by Scholastics, he indignantly denied the imputation. His "we see all things in God...AND BY THE LIGHT OF GOD, or IN DEO ET PER DEUM" (italics his), is certainly ontologicistic. (Cf. Collected Works 2:294). When Ontologism was condemned by Rome as pantheistic, Brownson, as a loyal Catholic, repudiated it, but in reality continued to hold it, as the above quotation from a work of 1867 shows. Typical writings: *Atheism Refuted* (210 pages), *Philosophy of Kant*, of Cousin, of Balme, of Gioberti, of Descartes, of Fr. Hill, S.J. In the last work he scores Fr. Hill in particular and Scholasticism in general through 46 pages (2:487-532). (References. Hist. of Phil.-Turner; Cath. Ency.; Ency. Brit.) Paul Dent, S.J.

* We are publishing these references and outlines in alphabetical order.

COMMUNICATIONS

MONISM AND PLURALITY OF FORMS

Editor of THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN:

Will you please offer a little assistance to a wretched peripatetic who feels himself veering towards the repugnant principles of monism? How can I hold plurality of substantial forms in an individual being and refute monism at the same time? Fr. Donat, as you know, favors subordinate and superimposed forms in a compound, and a recent writer in the New Scholasticism would seem to advocate a whole multitude of substantial forms in the living organism. Now if this is true, how do I know but that I am part of some still greater individual and together with all other beings make one grand unit whose all-embracing substantial form is the monistic absolute? I may be conscious that I am a distinct individual, but that does not prevent my being a part of some ^{more} perfect, more complete individual, if, as I say, we wish to defend plurality of forms. Perhaps we could solve the difficulty by changing our definition of substantial form. At present we define it as that incomplete substance which completes matter in its substantial being. But if this is the function of one form, what are to do with a second and a third? Changing definitions is a rather repugnant process. Then let us cease to talk about plurality of forms. Substantial change as Aristotle and St. Thomas understood it seems to be the only possible defence of unity in a compound, unless of course, the whole peripatetic doctrine is wrong. To say that substantial form is that which completes matter, and then to add that the resulting substance admits still further completion seems to lead to monism. Here is a proton and here an electron. Put them together and an individual atom results. Is not this not the same thing as saying that one plus one equals one. For if in the atom the proton and electron both retain their substantial forms, then I fail to see why they do not retain their individuality. Do we wish to defend grades of oneness? Is man ~~a~~ more ~~or less~~ perfectly one than the cells in his body? And if he is, why stop with him? Let us go on and up until at last everything in the universe is amalgamated in one glorious unity, and the absolute becomes the ultimate in substantial forms. If we are going to defend the unity of compounds and of ourselves

selves in the peripatetic fashion, then substantial change is the only explanation that can save us from absurdities. To my mind to admit plurality of forms is to corrupt the idea of oneness and to ~~step~~ pave the way to monism.

G.P.P.

SOULS AND SENATORS (Continued from page forty eight)

what the abstract and immaterial concepts like obligation, and loyalty, and mathematical points and justice mean. Animals may be able to do everything but talk— everything but express ideas. Dogs have souls but not like ours, the French Academy and United States Senators notwithstanding!

SPIRITUAL EXERCISES IN A SYLLOGISM (Continued from page fifty six)

The whole array of truths is brought to a well-rounded close by the meditation on Divine Love. This, with its "Suscipe", is but the final expression of my acceptance of the conclusion of the Syllogism of the Exercises, "I am bound to the ~~acceptance~~ imitation of Christ in poverty and humiliation". The Suscipe is nothing more ~~than~~ nor less than the logical result of a clear realization (and acceptance) of the status of Creator and creature together with their mutual relation. This sounds very much like the postulatium of the Foundation, though the identity of the Suscipe and the Foundation would hardly be admitted taking them isolated from the system of the Exercises. The intervening steps of purest logic are required to arch the gap. So it would not be a torture of truth, to say with Longridge that a circle has been described, enclosing "an organic whole, each part of which rests upon what has gone before, and is supposed in all that follows". So:-

As a creature of God I am bound to perfect service of God.

But,- perfect service of God is the imitation of Christ in poverty and humiliations.

Therefore,- I am bound to the imitation of Christ in poverty and humiliations.

Robert L. McCormack, S.J.

RADIO ACTIVITY recently

The following talks were given/by philosophers over station WEW:

Dec. 16, 1926	Mr. Gerald H. FitzGibbon, S.J.	That Word, Evolution.
Jan. 6, 1927	Mr. Vincent M. O'Flaherty, S.J.	How We Learn.
Jan. 13, 1927	Mr. Richard A. Welfle, S.J.	A Penchant for Evidence (on free will)

The following will be given soon:

Jan. 20, 1927	Mr. John J. O'Brien, S.J.	Have Dogs a Soul?
Jan. 27, 1927	Mr. George P. Prendergast, S.J.	Creation.
Feb. 3, 1927	Mr. Henry Wirtinberger, S.J.	Science in Philosophy.
Feb. 10, 1927	Mr. Richard A. Cahill, S.J.	Evils in the World.

BOOK REVIEW SECTION

The Book Review Department of THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN wishes this month to place before its readers recent Scholastic*Philosophy/ publications.

THE NEW SCHOLASTICISM:

The appearance of the first number of The New Scholasticism, a quarterly review of philosophy, which may be considered the organ of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, will be welcomed by the readers of THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN.

Commonweal in a brief notice of the new publication called special attention to the article by Etienne Gilson of La Sorbonne, "La Role de la Philosophie dans l'Histoire de la Civilization", a reprint of a paper read at the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, which evoked a fruitful discussion and won generous praise for its author.

But other numbers of the issue should prove no less interesting. In light of facts given by Dr. Zybara in his latest book, the article, "The Scholastic View of Faith and Reason", by Bishop Turner, should be of interest to non-Scholastic thinkers who wish to understand the Scholastic Philosopher's attitude towards these two sources of knowledge. In "Emergent Evolution", Alphonse M. Schwitalla, S.J., contrasts the views of Professor Lloyd C. Morgan on life and diety, as set forth in his book of that name, with the Scholastic views, and discusses the book as a "monument to the present mental status of biology".

Other articles are: "Cardinal Mercier: Philosopher", by Maurice de Wulf; "The Moral Sanction", by A.D. Sertillanges; "A Study of the Empirical and the Metaphysical Personality", by J. Albert Haldi. A chronicle of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, the book review section, and a valuable list of current philosophical reviews and book notes complete the issue.

L.C.B.

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THOUGHT:

Our readers are probably well acquainted with Thought, a quarterly of the sciences and letters. It has gone through three issues of the first volume. While the magazine deals with all the sciences, with history and letters it is of importance to philosophers because it has a regular department of Philosophy with an Editor at its head, and each ~~issue~~ number has one or more excellent articles on Philosophy. The December number contains "Scholastic Philosophy", by Anthony C? Cotter, S.J., a definition of Scholasticism. "Metaphor in Everyday Speech" might possibly of interest to the philosopher. Among the books reviewed: The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science, by Edwin Burttt, Ph.D., God and Reason, by Brosnan, S.J., Ph.D., God and Intelligence, by Sheon, M.A., Ph.D., La Philosophie Au Moyen Age, by Gilson, and The Key to the Stud of St. Thomas, by Olgiati.

BOOKS RECEIVED FOR REVIEW:

Thinking about Thinking, by C.J. Keyser. E.P. DUTTON & CO.

Problems and Principles of Modern Philosophy, by Ray Wood Sellars.

THE MACMILLAN CO.